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EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION-EXTENSION OF THE
PruvILEGE TO COMMUNICATION INVOLVING AGENTS-Suppose that
X sends his accountant to consult with his attorney regarding X's income
tax liability. Suppose the wife of X, at his request, consults a physician
concerning X's physical condition. Next, suppose that X dictates to his
stenographer a letter to his wife. On the other hand, suppose that X
enters his attorney's office, and, on £.nding no one there but the attorney's secretary, gives her information for the drafting of certain papers.
Suppose also that X calls at his doctor's office, and, £.nding only the
doctor's nurse there, tells her his symptoms, which she reduces to a
memo for her employer. And, £.nally, suppose that X attempts to reach
· his wife by telephone, but upoil' learning that she is out, gives his wife's
personal maid a message to be passed on to the wife.
Within certain limitations, the law immunizes con£.dential communications made to an attorney, spouse or physician1 from compulsory
disclosure at subsequent judicial proceedings. Frequently, as in the
above hypothetical situations, the subject matter of a communication
is voluntarily disclosed to a third person for transmittal to the ultimately intended recipient. The third person may be the agent of either
of the primary parties. Does this disclosure remove it from the privileged classification, notwithstanding the fact that the parties may still
have intended the information to be con£.dential? It is the purpose of
this comment, £.rst, to examine the extent to which the three common
privileges have been extended to communications through, by, or in
the presence of agents, and, second, to identify some of the probable
factors motivating such extension. For the most part, the decisions
have taken a rational and practical approach, but seldom indulge in any
extended discussion of the reasoning behind them.
1 The physician-patient privilege is entirely statutory, the other two being recognized
at common law.
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An examination of the cases can perhaps best be accomplished by
giving separate treatment to the three basic fact situations, viz., the situation in which the agent is a mere intermediary or conduit between
the parties, in which he is a managing agent with rather broad powers,
and lastly, in which he is a person necessarily present at the time of a
confidential conversation between the primary parties.

I. The Intermediary
If a letter is sent by a communicant to the party on the receiving
end of a privilege, no one seeing the letter except the person to whom it
is addressed, the letter is of course protected from compulsory disclosure. If someone learns of the contents of the letter by surreptitious
means, or overhears a privileged conversation, the knowledge so gained
may be disclosed. 2 But what if it is sought to question the telegraph
operator, the employee, friend, or other person who has in confidence
been permitted by the communicant to learn the contents of the communication in order to deliver it to the other party? With respect to
the attorney-client privilege, it is quite clear that communication
through an intermediary is protected. Theoretically, the fact that the
client has undertaken to use an indirect means of communication should
be one of the factors involved in determining whether the communication was really intended to be confidential.3 But as a practical matter,
the courts have been quite free in sanctioning this mode of communication, regardless of whether the intermediary happens to be the agent
of the client4 or a clerk of the attorney. 5 There are few cases relative to
2 Whether knowledge gained through connivance of a spouse may be divulged is not
clear. McNeill v. State, 117 Ark. 8, 173 S.W. 826 (1915) (not privileged); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 511, 23 S.W. 219 (1893) (privileged); People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y.
484, 35 N.E. 951 (1894) (not privileged). See also 10 Im,, L.J. 182 (1934).
s ". • , certainly a client who adopts the indirect instead of the direct method [of
communication] without good reason or reasonable necessity for so doing comes perilously
near the one who makes his verbal communication to his attorney in the presence of a third
person. In that case the verbal communication is not privileged, because it is presumed
that it was not intended to be confidential. • . • The question probably comes down after
all to one of whether or not the method employed was intended and understood to be
confidential, and in deciding that question, the presence or absence of reasonable necessity
would doubtless be an.important element." State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357 at 361, 88 A.
1045 (1913).
4 State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 A. 1045 (1913); Scales v. Kelley, 2 Lea (70
Tenn.) 706 (1879); Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S.E. 420
(1887); In re Heile, 65 Ohio App. 45, 29 N.E. (2d) 175 (1939).
5 Sibley v. Waffie, 16 N.Y. 180 (1857); Landsberger v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 450 (1855).
See also Hilary v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 104 Minn. 432, 116 N.W. 933 (1908)
and Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 177 S.E. 582 (1934). The authority for this statement
is old, no doubt because it has long been accepted.
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the intermediary in the physician-patient .field. But when actual necessity arises, as when it is essential that a third person go to a physician
for help because of the inability of the patient, then the privilege will
probably be recognized. 6 However, the privilege has not been extended
to the use of intermediaries between spouses, even when such method
is reasonably necessary. Thus a husband while in jail may not communicate with his spouse through a fellow prisoner without destroying
the privilege, 7 although an opposite result is reached on similar facts
in an attorney-client communication. 8

II. The Managing Agent
Frequently a client will give his employee or other agent a good
measure of responsibility in carrying on negotiations with the attorney. 9
Once the agency is established,1° information is protected whether it
originates with the client or the agent,11 and whether or not it is ultimately communicated directly to the attorney by the client.12 Generally,
however, documents or information so protected from compulsory disclosure must originate as communications to the attorney, and not as preexisting intra-office memoranda or business records.13 It would also
seem that the privilege is that of the client and not of the agent.14
6 People v. Brower, 53 Hun. (60 N.Y.) 217, 6 N.Y.S. 730 (1889). See also North
American Union v. Oleske, 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917).
7 State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 117 A. 713 (1922). See also Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, 70 A. 865 (1908) involving, in part, the privilege of spouse against
adverse testimony of other spouse.
8 State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 A. 1045 (1913).
9 Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1898) 87 F. 563.
10 LeLong v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N.Y.S. 150 (1921).
11 Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W. (2d) 413 (1942); Webb v. Francis J.
Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. (2d) 532 (1931).
12 ''Because it is so often necessary for clients to communicate with their attorneys with
the assistance or through the agency of others, as well as by their own personal action, the
privilege extends to a communication prepared by an agent or employe, whether it is
transmitted, directly to the attorney by the client or his agent or employe. Of course the
privilege is limited to the necessities of the situation. Where a document is prepared by an
agent or employe by direction of the employer for the purpose of obtaining the advice of
the attorney or for use in prospective or pending litigation, such document is in effect a
communication between attorney and client. The client is entitled to the same privilege
with respect to such communication as one prepared by himself." Schmitt v. Emery, 211
Minn. 547 at 552, 2 N.W. (2d) 413 (1942). Italics supplied.
13 See 26 MINN. L. REv. 744 (1942); 88 Umv. PA. L. REv. 467 (1940); and 28
VA. L. REv. 1133 (1942). It is here, however, that we run into difficult problems of discovery which would require an extended discussion beyond the scope of this paper. For
full treatment of the inter-relation of problems of discovery of pre-existing documents, the
attorney-client privilege, the use of agents by the client, and information coming to the
attorney from third persons generally, see 8 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE §§2294, 2307-8, 2317-19
(1940).
14 Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, 27 N.E. 483 (1890); Leyner v. Leyner, 123
Iowa 185, 98 N.W. 628 (1904).
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Occasionally the managing agent will be acting as sub-agent for the
attorney or physician. The attorney's clerk who types up information
supplied by the attorney, who in tum got it from the client, is silenced
just as is the attorney hirnself.15 Similarly, it has been held that reports to the attorney from agents sent to gather information at his behest are privileged,1 6 although information corning to him from third
parties generally is not. 17 Considerably more reluctance is shown toward extending the privilege to information corning to nurses while
acting under the general direction of a physician, but not actually assisting hirn. 18 Except in so far as the nurse is acting as an intermediary,
extension of the privilege to testimony by nurses does not seem justified. Because of this inherent nature of the privilege, similar circumstances do not arise in the case of husband and wife transactions.

III. Agent Necessarily Present
Contrary to the usual rule that presence of a third party at a conversation, otherwise privileged, negatives its confidentiality so that
it is no longer privileged,19 if that person is necessarily present as an
agent or assistant of either of the primary parties, the privilege is not
destroyed. The inquiry turns upon the question of how necessary is
the presence of the third party to the basic transaction. The easiest
case is that of the interpreter who is needed to breach a language gap
between the primary parties. 20 This situation is very similar to that
of the pure intermediary previously considered, except that in the latter,
one of the primary parties is absent. The presence of the attorney's
secretary at a consultation with the client does not defeat the privilege,21 and the same is generally true as regards the presence of a nurse
assisting a physician in an examination of the patient. 22 The presence
1 5Wartell v. Novograd, 48 R.I. 296, 137 A. 776 (1927); Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga.
691, 177 S.E. 582 (1934).
16 Steele v. Stewart, 1 Ph. 471, 41 Eng. Rep. 711 (1843).
17 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 89 F. Supp.
357; Ford v. Tennant, 32 Beav. 162, 55 Eng. Rep. 63 (1863); 8 WmMoRB, EVIDENCE
§2317 (1940).
18 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Kozlowski, 226 Wis. 641, 276 N.W. 300
(1937); See First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., (8th Cir. 1935)
79 F. (2d) 48, and Culver v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924).
19 See 15 Bos'l'. UNIV. L. R:ev. 846 (1935); 15 Umv. Cm. L. R:ev. 989 (1948); 63
A.L.R. 114 (1929); 96 A.L.R. 1419 (1935).
20 Maas v. Bloch, 7 Ind. 202 (1885).
21 Wartell v. Novograd, 48 R.I. 296, 137 A. 776 (1927); Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga.
691, 177 S.E. 582 (1934); 8 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE §2311 (1940).
22 Culver v. Union Pacific Ry., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924); Meyer v.
Russell, 55 N.D. 546, 214 N.W. 857 (1927); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan,
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of a mother at a consultation between an attorney and her young daughter, a prosecutrix in a seduction case, has been held not to negative the
privilege. 23 A similar result was reached when one spouse accompanied
the other to the physician when the purpose of the visit involved the
marital relationship, 24 but not otherwise. 25

IV. Factors Behind the Extension
In summary, it can be said that the decisions extend the privilege
rather liberally in the case of attorney-client communication, to a less
extent for physician-patient communication, and hardly at all for marital communication. For· the most part, this can be explained as a result
of four factors. 26
1. The language of particular statutes. The patient's privilege is
strictly statutory. The other two exist at common law, but are frequently found to be codified.27 It goes without saying that some regard
must be had for the particular statutory language in explaining particular decisions or groups of decisions. Not infrequently a statute provides
that the privilege is to extend to communications to attorney's clerks,
etc. Obviously such language makes it easy for an extension of the
privilege. But more important, the absence of such language in the
codification of one of the other privileges gives the court a peg upon
which to hang its hat in denying the extension of that privilege to
agents. 28
2. Strength of the policy behind the privilege. Although the attorney-client privilege has in the past been vehemently attacked by Jeremy
164 Miss. 174 (1932). Contra, Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, (9th Cir. 1925) 4 F. (2d)
215.
23 "It is well established that the privilege extends as well to communications to or
through an agent, as to those made directly to the attorney by the client in person, and we
think it is only a dictate of decency and propriety to regard the mother .•. as being present
and acting in the character of confidential agent of her daughter. The daughter's youth and
supposed modesty would render the presence and participation of her mother appropriate
and necessary." Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542 at 546 (1876).
24Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173, 270 N.W. 258 (1936).
25 Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Phila., (D.C. Cal. 1933)
2 F. Supp. 203.
2 6 These factors, relevant in discussing the extension of the privilege, are classifications
of the writer, being distinct from and not to be confused with Professor Wigmore's well•
known four prerequisites to the establishment of the basic privilege. See 8 WIGMORll,
EVIDBNCB §2285 (1940).
27 8 WxcMORll, EvmBNcE §2292 (1940).
28 See, for example, Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, (9th Cir. 1915) 4 F. (2d) 215;
First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 48;
and Hilary v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 104 Minn. 432, 116 N.W. 933 (1908).
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Bentham29 and others, the average court now is well satisfied with the
merits of the privilege. The same is true of the husband-wife privilege.
But there is no such unanimity of opinion as regards an immunity for
physician-patient transactions. It is still attacked30 and has been recognized by statutes in only about half of the states. To the extent that
the basis of the privilege is meritorious in the eyes of the court, to
that extent it would seem that the court should be more willing to extend it to cover communications involving agents.
3. Necessity of an extension of the privilege to the relationship
sought to be fostered. Whether or not there is complete justification,
there are basic reasons for allowing each of the three common privileges.
The attorney-client and physician-patient immunities have been established to encourage freedom of subjective thought so that the client or
patient will freely disclose all information at his command, thereby
enabling the attorney or physician to give maximum service and protection to the communicant.31 On the other hand, the husband-wife
privilege is given to promote mutual trust between the spouses, thereby
increasing the likelihood of a stable marriage. At first glance, the reasons behind the privileges appear to be the same. But the husband-wife
privilege may be distinguished in that the relationship sought to be fostered is a continuing one.32 The carving out of a segment, viz., communication through agents, from all communications sheltered from
compulsory disclosure, will not break down the whole marital relationship so long as day to day protection is given to the greater portion of
marital confidences. On the other hand, with respect to the attorneyclient and physician-patient privileges, the importance of each transaction looms large, and its denial for any particular class of communications destroys its whole foundation. Herein lies one of the probable reasons why courts have been willing to extend the privilege to communications involving agents in the attorney-client and physician-patient
fields, but hardly at all as to communications between spouses.
29 BENTHAM, RATIONALE oF JomCIAL EVIDENCE, bk. IX, pt. IV, c. 5, §2 (Bowring's

ed. 1843, Vol. VII, pp. 474 ff.).
so 8 W1GMORE, Evro:ENcE §2380 (1940).
31 Not every communication made to an attorney or physician is privileged. However,
it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the general limitations on the scope of the
subject matter of privileged communications.
32 Compare, however, the privilege formerly given, but now in disfavor, to protect one
spouse from testifying for or against the other, one of the reasons for which was to preserve
the marital status at the time of suit. 8 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE §§2228, 2237 (1940).
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4. Necessity for the use of agents in effecting the communication.88
To.a large degree, the subject matter of an attorney-client communication is concerned with business matters. Doing business involves the use
of agents. It cannot be expected that the proprietor of a large business, let alone a corporation (which can act only through agents), can
attend to all legal matters personally. As has been seen, a practical approach is taken by the courts, and free use of agents is permitted without destruction of the privilege on grounds of "necessity," that word
being taken in the sense of business convenience rather than impossibility of performing the task in another manner. The opposite is true
in regard to communications b~tween husband and wife, which communications are inherently personal.34 This is not to say that a case
may not arise where it is essential for one spouse to communicate with
the other through an intermediary, but seldom is it even reasonably
necessary.35 In Wolfl,e 11. United States,86 a leading case in the field,
wherein. a husband dictated to his stenographer a letter to his wife,
Justice Stone said, "But we do not think the question which we have
to determine is one of fact whether the petitioner's letter to his wife was
intended to be confidential. . . . Accordingly the question with which
we are now concerned is the extent to which the privilege which the
law concedes to communications made confidentially between the
husband and wife embraces the transmission of them, likewise in confidence, through a third party intermediary, communications with whom
are not themselves protected by any privilege. . . . The privilege suppresses relevant testimony and should be allowed only when it is plain
that marital confidence can not otherwise reasonably be preserved.
Nothing in this case suggests any such necessity." From the context it is
apparent that the Court was speaking of reasonable necessity to the communication rather than to the relationship. The physician-patient privilege lies somewhere in between. With respect to this relationship there
may be occasions when actual necessity demands that the request for
medical help be made through a third person. Furthermore, from the
standpoint of both the attorney and physician, it may be impractical for
their work to be carried on without the aid of assistants. Disclosure to
88 Note that necessity may be a factor in determining whether the communication was
intended to be confidential. See State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 A. 1045 (1913).
84 Indeed it has been held that the husband-wife privilege does not extend to communications involving business matters because they are not confidential. Grossman v.
Lindemann, 67 Misc. 437, 123 N.Y.S. 108 (1910); Gifford v. Gifford, 58 Ind. App. 665,
107 N.E. 308 (1914).
sr; WolHe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S.Ct. 279 (1933).
86 291 U.S. 7 at 15, 17, 54 S.Ct. 279 (1933).
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these assistants prior to, in the course of, or subsequent to the communication occurs in the normal course of events. It must be recognized, however, that the necessity of business confidence alone has not been considered a valid basis for a privilege or an extension thereof. 87
Summary

The fact situations involving communication through, by, or in the
presence of agents are too numerous to permit any generalizations of the
law, except to say that the courts take a practical business-like approac~
extending the privileges only when it is reasonably necessary to maintain the relationship and to effect the communication. Since neither
type necessity is present with respect to marital communications, extension in this area has not been sanctioned.

C.

J.

Rice, S. Ed.

87 See note by Professor Wigmore criticizing Oregon code provision establishing a
new privilege for communications between an employer and his stenographer. 12 Onn. L.
R:av. 216 (1933).

